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ONE of the most influential ideas in the modern world has been
 
the theory of fictions, which received its fullest treatment in the book
 
entitled The Philosophy of 'As If
'
 (by the German philosopher Hans  
Vaihinger), written around 1875 but not published until 1911. This
 book was so successful on the Continent that Vaihinger in 1919, in
 collaboration with Dr. Raymond Schmidt, founded, a magazine,
 Annalen der Philosophic (“with particular reference to the problems
 of the 'As if approach”)? contributors to which included “not 
only professional philosophers (Cornelius, Groos, Becher, Bergman,
 Koffka, Kowaleski) but also eminent representatives of the most
 important branches of science, the theologian Heim, the lawyer
 Kruchman, the doctor Abderhalden, the mathematician Pasch, the
 physicist Volkman, the biological botanist Hansen, the economist
 Pohle, and the art-historian Lange?’1 The fame of Vaihinger’
s
 work  
quickly spread to England, where his book was translated into English
 by C. K. Ogden and published in 1924 in the International Library of
 Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, of 
which
 Ogden was  
general editor. Ogden hailed the book as “monumental”2 and later
 (in his introduction to Jeremy Bentham’s earlier book on the same
 subject, 
which
 he reprinted in the International Library in 1932)  
added that “Today a Philosophy of As-if dominates scientific
 thought.”3 The fame of Vaihinger’s work had become world wide so
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that, although The Philosophy of 'As If
'
 is written in a rather tech ­
nical and (for the most part) dry style, a second edition (English)
 appeared in 1935 and a reprinting in 1949. That Vaihinger’
s
 tremen ­
dous influence was not limited to scientific thought but had permeated
 all aspects of modem philosophy was attested by Etienne Gilson, who,
 in his book The Unity of Philosophical Experience (1952), said:
For what is now called philosophy is either collective
 
mental slavery or scepticism. There still are men who hate
 both, and will not lament the passing of that alternative.
 But it will not pass away so long as the title of Vaihinger’s
 book remains the program of our philosophical teaching:
 The Philosophy of the As If being a system of the theo
­retical, practical and religious fictions of mankind, on the
 basis of an idealistic philosophy. . . . The time 
of
 the  
'As ifs’ is over; what we now need is a 'This is so,’ and we
 shall not find it, unless we first recover both our lost
 confidence in the rational validity of metaphysics and our
 long-forgotten knowledge of its object.4
Jeremy Bentham’s book entitled Chrestomathia or Theory of Fictions5
 
published in 1815, 
is
 still in several ways superior to Vaihinger’s, but  
since Bentham’
s
 work has for the most part been either ignored or  
dismissed (as Ogden says in his introduction to the edition referred
 to above), “with contemptuous reference,” and since Vaihinger’s work
 has had such a great
 
influence on modern thought, it seems appropriate  
to reconsider Vaihinger to try to understand the reason for the great
 appeal of his system.
In the beginning, it may be noted that Vaihinger, while claiming
 
to be most carefully scientific in his approach, assures the reader that
 both biological and spiritual benefits may be derived from the planned
 use in one’
s
 life of fictions, which he carefully defines as “hypotheses  
which are known to be false, but which are employed because of their
 utility” (HV, p. xliii). Biologically, thought, when used in this
 fashion, acts “as a means in the service of the Will to Live and
 dominate” (HV, p. xlvi). But this is only the beginning, from which
 mighty spiritual benefits will eventually flow. “Thus, before our very
 eyes does a small psychical artifice not only develop into a mighty
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source of the whole theoretical explanation of the world—for all
 
categories arise from it—but it. also becomes the origin of all the
 idealistic belief and behaviour of mankind” (HV, p. 49). Surely,
 such a wonder-working device deserves our most careful consideration,
 even if we may be inclined to decide that the promises made here are
 almost as hard to believe as the miracles and paradoxes of religious
 orthodoxy. Of course, from 
one
 standpoint, we are assured that we  
need not believe anything. Vaihinger is a positivist, he tells us,
 believing that “we must accept as actually real only certain sequences
 of sensation” (HV, p. 68) and that “the psyche must be regarded as
 a machine,” which “works according to psycho-mechanical and psycho
­chemical laws ...” (HV, p. 101). All the rest is a process of fictions,
 but, somewhat paradoxically to say the least, we must believe in the
 amazing efficacy of these fictions.
And then, when we begin to examine Vaihinger’s 
system
 in detail,  
we encounter a startling number of paradoxes which, even under the
 most sympathetic inspection, prove to 
be
 dangerously like ordinary  
contradictions. This disappointing tendency is apparent from the
 beginning in
 
his unqualified definition of fictions as “hypotheses which  
are known to be false, but which are employed because of their
 utility” (HV, p. xliii), utility, as he makes clear on the 
same
 page,  
in the sense of ethical value. This 
is
 in his Introduction, but a little  
further on he tells us that fictions are useful only so long as they
 are not known to be false. “We must accept as actually real 
only certain sequences of sensation, from which there 
arise,
 in accordance  
with definite laws, structures that are treated as fictions” (HV, p. 68).
 He refers here to “fictitious constructs” like space, matter, etc., which
 “arise out of elementary sensations” and 
which
 as “products of the  
psyche must also 
be
 regarded as fictions created by the logical impulse  
in order to attain its goal,” but “
as
 soon as the mechanism by means  
of which these concepts perform such efficacious service is disclosed,
 the illusion of their truth disappears” (HV, p. 69), and they should
 be discarded. Here the fictions seem to be created by a benevolent,
 though mechanical, device of nature to protect us from shock until
 we are emotionally mature enough to dispense with “the illusion of
 their truth.”
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But a problem arises from the relation between his original defini
­
tion of fictions as consciously false assumptions and his further
 statement that we cannot know the world of reality, since “we must
 accept as actually real only certain sequences of sensation” (HV, p.
 68). “Many thought
 
processes,” he says, “appear to  be consciously false  
assumptions, 
which
 either contradict reality or are even contradictory  
in themselves, but 
which
 are intentionally transformed in order to  
overcome difficulties of thought by this artificial deviation” (HV,
 pp. xvli-xlvii). But if Vaihinger cannot know objective reality, how
 can he know when it is contradicted? How can he know, in other
 words, whether our thought processes may not, to some extent at
 least, reflect reality? For example, why does Vaihinger include as
 one of his “consciously false assumptions” the belief in a God? “It
 is a satisfying Fiction,” he says, “for many to regard the world 
as
 if  
a more perfect Higher Spirit had created or at least regulated it”
 (HV, p. xlvii). Not even Bertrand Russell’s atheism 
is
 this dog ­
matic; Russell admits the possibility, though not the probability, that
 there is a God. It would have seemed more logical for Vaihinger, like
 Kant, to refer to God as an hypothesis, except for the fact that
 Vaihinger considers an hypothesis as an assumption the truth of which
 can 
be
 proved by further experience. At least, in view of the almost  
universal belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, Vaihinger would
 have seemed less narrowly dogmatic if he had considered God as what
 Bentham, in his Theory of Fictions, called an “inferential entity.”
 Bentham of course was a skeptic, but he was not willing to call God a
 fictitious entity since the existence of such an entity could be scien
­tifically no more disproved than proved. Bentham defined an in
­ferential entity as one “which is not made known to human beings in
 general, by the testimony of sense, but of the existence of which the
 persuasion 
is
 produced by reflection— is inferred from a chain of  
reasoning.”0 Bentham also put in this category the soul considered as
 existing in a state of separation from the body.
Vaihinger, as might be expected, runs into logical difficulty on the
 
problem of freedom. He says that “the idea of freedom is 
one
 of the  
most important concepts ever formed by man,” though it is a fiction
 since such an idea “contradicts observation which shows that every
­
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thing obeys unalterable laws” (HV, p. 43). Freedom, then, is a
 
fiction but an important one: “In the course of their development,
 men have formed this important construct from immanent necessity,
 because only on this basis is a high degree of culture and morality
 possible” (HV, p. 43). We act as if there were freedom when there
 really is none, and on this basis we develop a high 
system
 of morality,  
but Vaihinger should not use the word morality here since it usually
 indicates free will or responsibility for one’
s
 actions which he denies.  
But he says the fiction is useful, for example, in criminal law, “For if
 there is to be punishment there must also be guilt, but this cannot
 exist where responsibility and freedom are denied” (HV, p. 45). But
 Vaihinger’
s
 insistence that the idea of punishment must be maintained  
for the protection of society seems rather cruel, because society could
 be protected also by treating the criminal as if he were merely
 ill, as many modern criminologists now advocate. Vaihinger’s fallaci
­ous attempt to claim Kant as an ally will be treated in detail later, but
 is mentioned here to show another basic contradiction, which is really
 Vaihinger’
s
 and not Kant’s. “Thus, according to Kant,” says Vai ­
hinger, “man is not merely to be judged in his conduct as if he were a
 free agent, but should conduct himself as if, at some time or other,
 he were to be held accountable for his acts” (HV, p. 47). The word
 should here indicates obligation which may or may not be fulfilled and
 contradictorily indicates even in this deterministic statement that man
 is, to some extent at least, a free agent.
The same kind of contradiction appears in Vaihinger’s account
 
of our psyche. “The psyche,” he says, “must therefore be regarded as
 a machine, not only 
because
 it works according to psycho-mechanical  
and psycho-chemical laws, but in the sense that its natural forces are
 intensified 
by
 these mechanical processes” (HV, p. 101). In other  
words he is here a pure determinist, but on the same page he says that
 just as “man is continually perfecting his machines,” so “the psyche is
 always perfecting its mechanisms. . . . Thus the psyche is a machine
 which is continually improving itself . . .” (HV, p. 101). There is
 certainly confusion here. To say that the psyche improves itself
 would seem to give it a certain amount of initiative 
which
 it could  
not have if it were actuated 
only
 by “psycho-mechanical and psycho ­
5
Campbell: Some Facts About the Theory of Fiction
Published by eGrove, 1960
56 Some Facts about the Theory of Fictions
chemical laws.” We might reconcile this contradiction in part by as
­
suming that the mechanical processes, derived from what Vaihinger
 calls elsewhere “immanent necessity” (a kind of beneficent elan vital) ,
 operate on the psyche to improve its efficiency, but on the next page
 this partial reconciliation is made impossible when Vaihinger says
 that “The proper task of methodology is to teach us to manipulate
 this instrument, this thought-machine” (HV, p. 102). Freedom, he
 maintains, is a fiction, and yet somebody (presumably Vaihinger) can
 work out a methodology from 
which
 we can learn “to manipulate this  
instrument, this thought-machine.” There are three instances of free
­dom here: (1) “our” teacher of methodology, who may or may not
 work out this methodology; (2) “we,” who may or may not elect to
 learn it and who (3) may or may not elect to use our knowledge and
 power after we receive it. But if we do manipulate this “thought
­machine,” we 
will
 be using a great amount of freedom.
Vaihinger contradicts himself even about contradictions. On one
 page he says, “The main result of our investigation is, then, that
 contradiction is the driving force of thought and that without it
 thought could not attain its goal at all . . . what we generally call
 truth . . . is merely the most expedient error. . . . So-called agree
­ment with reality must finally be abandoned as a criterion” (HV, p.
 108). But on the very next page he says:
All departures from reality and all self-contradictions are
 
logical errors of the first degree . . . these errors must be
 cancelled, because otherwise the fictions would be valueless
 and harmful. ... If, in fictions, thought contradicts
 reality, or even if it contradicts itself, and if in spite of this
 questionable procedure it nevertheless succeeds in corre
­sponding to reality, then this deviation must have been
 corrected and the contradiction must have been made good.
 (HV, p. 109).
 Thought must correspond to reality, he says here, but on the previous
 page he has said that “agreement with reality must finally be aban
­doned as a criterion.” And if all departures from reality are mis
­takes, then it would seem that fictions, defined by Vaihinger elsewhere
 as “consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or
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are even contradictory in 
themselves
” (HV, pp. xlvi-xlvii), would cer ­
tainly be mistakes and the thesis of his whole book would be cancelled.
Keeping in mind Vaihinger’s original definition of fictions as
 
“hypotheses which are known to 
be
 false but which are used because  
of their utility,” it would seem that he also almost breaks 
down
 his  
theory in the following statement: “The mind has a tendency to bring
 all ideational contents into equilibrium and to establish an unbroken
 connection between them. An hypothesis is inimical to this tendency
 in so far as it involves the idea that it is not to be placed on an
 equality with the other objective ideas” (HV, p. 125). He then admits
 that a fiction even more than an hypothesis “interferes with the
 tendency toward an equilibration of ideational constructs. The hy
­pothesis only hampers this adjustment negatively and indirectly, but
 the fiction hampers it directly and positively” (HV, p. 126). But a
 great part of his argument for fictions has been their “utility” in
 smoothing out thought processes in spite of the fact that they are
 “consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality or are
 even contradictory in themselves . . .” (HV, pp. xlvi-xlvii). In fact,
 just five pages beyond his above statement about fiction “interfering
 directly and positively with the tendency toward an equilibration of
 ideational constructs,” he seems to reverse himself by considering
 fictions as beneficial in promoting the working of the “law of the
 resolution of psychical tension”: “One beneficial effect is that by
 this tendency to adjustment dogmas and hypotheses are, where possible
 or expedient, transformed into fictions. For so long as these ideational
 constructs are supposed to have objective value, contradictions and
 difficulties arise which disappear if we regard them as mere fictions”
 (HV, p. 133). Once more Vaihinger has contradicted himself about
 contradictions as well as about the effect on the psyche of fictions.
Again in this same chapter entitled “The Law of Ideational
 
Shifts,” Vaihinger’s attitude toward the history of religions seems
 ambiguous if not actually contradictory. He has all along indicated
 that to consider religious dogma as fiction is not only the best but
 indeed the only proper way to consider it. He agrees with the
 philosopher Forberg that “it is not a duty to believe that there exists
 a moral world-government or a God as moral world-ruler; our duty is
7
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simply to act as if we believed it” (HV, p. 323). He has, as we have
 
seen, even gone so far as to say that “as soon as this as if is trans
­formed into a because, its purely ethical character vanishes and it
 becomes simply a matter of our 
lower
 interests, mere egotism” (HV,  
p. 49)—
which
 would certainly imply that the quality of religion is 
vastly improved when the because, which sometimes comes first, is
 transformed into an as if, 
which
 “small psychical artifice . . . becomes  
the origin of all the idealistic belief and behaviour of mankind”
 (HV, p. 49). That
 
is, belief and behaviour  based on God, immortality,  
reward, punishment, etc., as hypotheses are not really idealistic; indeed
 their ethical character is “destroyed.” Keeping in mind his repeated
 emphasis on the above ideas, it is curious that he definitely connects
 his “law of ideational shifts” with the “decline and break-up” (one
 would have expected him to say “the great improvement”) of religion
 (the shift being from dogma to hypothesis to fiction as the religion
 
decli
nes more and more). “At first,” he says,
all religion consists of general dogmas. . . . Then doubt
 appears and the idea becomes an hypothesis. As doubt
 grows stronger, there are some who reject the idea entirely,
 while others maintain it either 
as
 a public or a private fic­
tion. This last condition is typical of every religion so far
 known when it has reached a certain 
age.
 It can be seen to  
great advantage in Greek religion, where the Greek folk
­deities were at first general dogmas. . . . Subsequently
 they became fictions for the educated classes, who adhered
 tenaciously to the worship of God, or rather of the gods,
 although convinced that the 
ideas
 represented nothing real.
The most extensive series of errors in Vaihinger’s book are re
­vealed in his valiant efforts to make Kant his ally in considering as
 fictions rather than hypotheses the Thing-in-itself, God, immortality,
 liberty, and other such ideas not scientifically verifiable. In Part I he
 finds himself disappointed because Kant “wavers between the Ding an
 sich, as an hypothesis or a fiction” (HV, p. 74). Kant’s 
system,
 says  
Vaihinger, logically demanded the Ding an sich as a fiction.
Just as we introduce into mathematics and mechanics ideas
 
which facilitate our task, so Kant introduces a device in the
 form of the concept Ding an sich, as an x to 
which
 a y,  
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the ego, as our organization, corresponds. By this means
 
the whole world of reality can be dealt with. Subsequently
 the ’
ego
’ and the Ding an sich are dropped, and only  
sensations remain as real. From our point of view the
 sequence of 
sensations
 constitutes ultimate reality, and  
two poles are mentally added, subject and object. (HV,
 pp. 75-76)
This kind of temporary use of the Ding an sich, Vaihinger is saying,
 
like the temporary use of “fictitious constructs—space, matter, etc.,”
 mentioned above, would have done Kant credit. In other 
words,
 the  
Thing-in-itself would have been “the most brilliant of all conceptual
 instruments” if Kant had used it temporarily as a fiction so that “the
 whole world” might “appear to be understood as an effect,” and if
 he had then dropped it to accept the mature wisdom of Vaihinger’s
 basic doctrine that “only sensations remain as real.” But unfortunately
 Kant “did not adhere to this definite standpoint, but his Ding an sich
 
becam
e a reality, in short an hypothesis, and hence his hesitating dis ­
cussion of the concept” (HV, p. 76). “The great philosopher stained
 
his
 glorious discoveries by clinging to effete rationalistic dogmas and  
thus himself contributed to the fate of his true achievement, 
which was consigned to oblivion” (HV, p. 30).
Vaihinger can never, in Part I of his book, stop chiding Kant for
 
not consistently maintaining the point of view that his scientifically
 unverifiable ideas were fictions. Though the misguided Kant did not
 consistently hold to this view, in 
ethics,
 for example, Vaihinger states  
what constitutes the real principle of Kantian ethics,
 namely, that true morality must always rest upon a fictional
 basis. All the hypothetical bases, God, immortality, reward,
 punishment, etc., destroy its ethical character, i. e. we must
 act with the same seriousness and the 
same
 scruples as if the  
duty 
were
 imposed by God. . . . But as soon as this as if  
is transformed into a because, its purely ethical character
 vanishes and it becomes simply 
a
 matter of our lower inter ­
ests, mere egotism. (HV, p. 49)
In other 
words,
 Vaihinger is saying that all the religious believers,  
including the great saints, who have not regarded as fictions “the
 hypothetical bases, God, immortality, reward, punishment, etc.,” have
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acted out of 'lower interests, mere egotism.” This would of course
 
include Christ himself.
Another slightly puzzling idea in the above explanation of what,
 
even if Kant did not have insight enough to maintain it, constitutes
 “the real principle of Kantian ethics” is the statement that “true
 morality must always rest upon a fictional basis.” But why, one
 wonders, cannot the fiction of morality, as Vaihinger has argued for
 the Thing-in-itself, be kept up only temporarily until the psyche is
 ready for the mature 
wisdom
 of his doctrine that “only sensations  
remain as real”? Perhaps we will understand the distinction in due
 time. In the meantime, it is pleasant to contemplate the soaring elo
­quence of his next sentence: “Thus, before our very eyes, does a small
 psychical artifice not only develop into a mighty source of the whole
 theoretical explanation of the world—for all categories arise from it—
 but it also becomes the origin of all the idealistic belief and behaviour
 of mankind” (HV, p. 49).
Now since such wonderful results flow from this “small 
psychical 
artifice,” he generously decides that Kant after all must have really
 meant to be an “As-Ifer” in Vaihinger’s sense of the term and devotes
 forty-seven pages of Part III to arguing thus. It is my firm belief
 that Vaihinger is mistaken in maintaining that Kant ever considered
 his transcendental ideas fictions, in Vaihinger’s sense of fictions as
 mental constructs known to be false. First, I 
cite
 three passages early  
in The Critique of Pure Reason, 
which
 appeared in 1781 and to which  
Vaihinger devotes more attention than to any other of Kant’s works.
 First, Kant makes it clear that he regards things in themselves as real
 in the following passage: “The estimate of our rational cognition
 a priori at which we arrive 
is
 that it has only to do with phenomena,  
and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence [italics
 mine] lie beyond its sphere.”7 Again, on the next page 
he
 says:
. . . while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still
 reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in them
­selves. ... In order to cognize an object, I must be able
 to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by
 experience, 
or
 a priori, by means of reason. But I can  
think what I please, provided ... my conception is a
10
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possible thought, though I may be unable to 
answer
 for the  
existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possi
­bilities. But something more is required before I can at
­tribute to such a conception objective validity. ... We
 are not however confined to theoretical sources of cognition
 for the means of satisfying this additional requirement,
 but may derive them from practical sources. (Critique, p. 9)
 Kant’s whole effort in his approach to the subject of God, freedom,
 immortality, etc., was to “satisfy this additional requirement” 
so
 that  
he could attribute to his concepts the “real possibility” of “objective
 validity.”
And the third passage occurs on the next page, where he says, “I
 
must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief”
 (Critique, p. 10). He certainly 
was
 not abolishing knowledge to make  
room for fictions in Vaihinger’s sense of the term, and it is clear that
 when Kant uses the word which is translated fiction he is using it as
 synonymous with hypothesis.
I have quoted these passages from the first few pages of the
 
Critique of Pure Reason to indicate that Vaihinger 
was
 mistaken in  
thinking that Kant even began with the idea of the Thing-in-itself
 as a fiction.
Vaihinger, even in dealing with this work which seems most to
 
favor his view of Kant, carefully selects a few sections for comment
 and from these quotes portions of passages 
which
 seem to make Kant  
an “As-Ifer” in Vaihinger’
s
 sense of the term. But even on the ground  
selected by Vaihinger his interpretation will not work. He first selects 
 the section entitled “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.”
 “Near the beginning of the section,” Vaihinger says, “we find the
 'rational concepts’ described as 'mere ideas,’ 
as
 'heuristic fictions,’ and  
expressly distinguished from hypotheses” (HV, p. 272). But this 
is exactly what Kant has not done, as would be indicated in the very
 title of this section, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:
This critique of reason has now taught us that all its
 
efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure
 speculation, are utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it
 may appear, lies open to hypothesis; as, where we cannot
 know with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses and
 to form suppositions. (Critique, p. 227)
11
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And the 
whole
 section is devoted to this procedure.
In the paragraph referred to by Vaihinger, Kant is concerned as
 always to make it clear that 
these
 hypotheses about the realm of pure  
reason (the noumena) do not apply in the phenomenal world. “The
 conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and
 do not relate to any object in any kind of experience.” But “mere
 ideas” are not fictions in Vaihinger’s sense of the term. When Kant
 says that they “cannot be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of
 real phenomena,” he is emphasizing, as he does throughout this para
­graph, that one must go as far as possible in the phenomenal world
 and not confuse it with the noumenal. The noumenal world, though
 not demonstrable, Kant 
always
 considered as necessary, universal, and  
real in its sphere. Each object indeed has a sensuous character and an
 intelligible character, the latter by no means to be considered as
 “imaginary” in spite of the fact that it cannot 
be
 experienced as a  
“real phenomenon.” In the past part (entitled “Scepticism not a
 Permanent State for Human Reason”) of Section II immediately
 preceding this section discussed by Vaihinger, Kant finds Hume
 defective on this very point. Hume mistakenly “believed he could
 infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we
 can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in
 framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition 
a
 priori”  
(Critique, p. 226). Vaihinger would take us right back into Hume’s
 error of regarding the ultimate reality as phenomenal, a conclusion
 which Kant opposes with all his might.
There are undoubtedly some fields in which fictions in Vaihinger’s
 
sense are useful, as, for example, the 
one
 in the German Commercial  
Code which provided (at the time Vaihinger was writing, about 1875)
 that “goods not returned to the sender within the proper time are to
 be regarded as if the recipient had definitely authorized and accepted
 them” (HV, p. 35). In mathematics also such fictional constructs as
 negative, irrational, and imaginary numbers, as Vaihinger
 
says, “possess  
great value for the advancement of science and the generalization of
 its results in spite of the crass contradictions 
which
 they contain”  
(HV, p. 57). But granted the limited procedural usefulness of fic
­tions in the sciences, mathematics, jurisprudence, and certain other
 
12
Studies in English, Vol. 1 [1960], Art. 7
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/ms_studies_eng/vol1/iss1/7
Harry M. Campbell 63
fields, Vaihinger’s mistake lies in pushing his theory too far into the
 
philosophy of religion, in which analogies with these other fields must
 be handled with great caution. Vaihinger is correct in saying repeat
­edly that “Without the imaginary factor neither science nor life in
 their [sic] highest form are [sic] possible” (HV, p. 44). But the
 question 
is
 whether the imagination employed in religious speculation,  
which forms a very important part of Vaihinger’
s
 concern with life,  
issues in hypotheses or fictions. As Vaihinger has well said, an
 hypothesis sometimes becomes “degraded” into a fiction, but he at the
 same time seems to feel that such a change is really progress. I should
 agree that it 
is
 well for an honest man to know when an hypothesis  
is no longer valid as such (that is, cannot lead into eventual truth),
 but when it is definitely discarded as an hypothesis, then it has little
 value, either practically or theoretically, in philosophy or religion.
 Most intelligent people surely cannot shape their lives ultimately
 around ideas which in their opinion are fictions, though it 
is
 amazing  
how many think they are doing so. Kant may have been wrong, but
 at least he “abolished knowledge, to make room for belief” not for
 fictions in Vaihinger’s sense. The beliefs for 
which
 Kant thus made  
room 
were
 the traditional ones in God, freedom, and immortality.  
Many modem philosophers have acknowledged the genius of Kant’s
 destruction of knowledge about metaphysics but have not been much
 impressed with his back door return to faith through moralism. It is
 strange, however, that some who thus condemn Kant will accept as
 perfectly convincing a system like that of Vaihinger. Such a 
system would appear to be indeed a desperate shift—evidence of the last stage
 of a culture when many sophisticated thinkers, having lost religious
 faith, cannot abide the consequences of its disappearance and have
 taken a precarious refuge under the flimsy shelter of fictions—a
 procedure in some respects fully as naive as primitive word-magic.
 Language, the ultimate reality through “autonomous” symbolism, is
 our refuge; such is the message of a prominent school of modem
 philosophers.8 The same idea is a fundamental one for I. A. Richards,
 who has an international reputation as a psychologist, literary critic,
 and poet, and who can speak with authority for a large group in each
 of these three fields. Richards in his Coleridge on the Imagination
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speaks almost ecstatically about the prospect of “a general theoretical
 
study of language capable of opening to us new powers over our
 minds comparable to those which systematic physical inquiries are
 giving us over our environment.”9 For Richards the gospel of language
 will take the form of poetry (this of course in the tradition of Matthew
 Arnold’s Literature and Dogma and much speculation since that time):
 “If philosophic contemplation, or religious experience, or science gave
 
us
 Reality,” says Richards,
then poetry gave us something of less consequence, at 
best some sort of shadow. If we grant that all is myth,
 poetry, as the myth-making which most brings 'the whole
 soul of man into activity’ . . . becomes the necessary
 channel for the reconstitution of order . . . poetry . . .
will remake our minds and with them our world.10
But other poets, though like Richards in proclaiming the gospel of
 
poetry, seem considerably less happy about it than he. In the sinuous
 paradoxes of Wallace Stevens—for example, his “Profundum, physical
 thunder, dimensions in which we believe without belief, beyond
 belief”—11 there is an undercurrent of melancholy, as, to return to
 the philosophers, there certainly is in the more violent paradoxes of two
 prominent modern German existentialists, Jaspers and Heidegger.
 Says Jaspers: “Just 
as
 Being and Nothingness are inseparable, each  
containing the other, yet each violently repelling the other, so faith




Does Nothing exist only because the Not, 
i.
 e., negation,  
exists? Or is it the other way about? Does negation and
 the Not exist only because Nothing exists? Where shall we
 seek Nothing? . . . Only in the clear night of dread’s
 Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original
 overtness: that it is 
'is
’ and is not Nothing ... the Nothing  
nothings.13
All the above are various versions, differing only in tone and
 
degree, of the theory of fictions, even though some theorists, like
 Stevens and the two German existentialists, have evolved the most
 ingenious fiction of all—that their system both is and is not fiction.
 There are many other modem versions of the 
same
 As-If system, and
14
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I propose to treat a number of them later. There are certainly enough
 
to justify the statements of Ogden and Gilson (quoted in the begin
­ning of this essay) that the philosophy of As If is a very powerful in
­fluence in our age. Apropos of all this, my contention, quite simply,
 is that if one cannot believe, he must prepare himself to forego the
 consolations that reward the believer, and try, even if in vain without
 divine assistance, to find in human relationships a source for his
 “emotional equilibration.”
xHans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If
'
 (London, 1924), pp. xlvii-xlviii  
(hereafter referred to as HV).
2Ibid., Preface, p. 
vi.
3C. K. Ogden (ed.), Bentham's Theory of Fictions (London, 1932), p. cxlviii.





5deferred to in Ogden, Introduction, p. xxxiii.6Bentham's Theory of Fictions, p. 8.
7Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, in Great Books of the Western
 
World (Chicago, 1952), LXII, 8—hereafter referred to as Critique.
8Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York, 1946) and Mrs. Susanne
 
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York, 1942), and the books to which they
 refer.
9I. A. Richards, Coleridge on the Imagination (New York, 1935), p. 232.
10Ibid., pp. 228, 229.
11Quoted in Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York,
 
1953), p. 
181. 12Quoted in Hector Hawton, The Feast of Unreason (London, 1952), p. 200.
13Quoted in ibid., p. 188.
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